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FISHERY AND ECONOMIC ZONES AS
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A majority of coastal States unilaterally claim either a 200-mile
fishery or economic zone in their contiguous waters. In the ab-
sence of a validating global treaty, are legal rights and obliga-
tions created in the international community as a concomitant of
these claims? This Comment explores the customary law forma-
tion process as an alternative to the creation of international law
by convention at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea. Four elements generally accepted as requisite to the
evolution of a usage into a general practice accepted as law are
defined, applied, and found extant in the case of fishery zones
and to a considerable degree in that of economic zones.
INTRODUCTION
The number of unilateral coastal State claims to ocean resource
jurisdiction has increased during the past decade.' Two types of
claims predominate.2 The claim to a fishery zone involves coastal
State jurisdiction to exploit and conserve the living resources of
adjacent waters.3 The second type of claim is to an economic
zone. A claim to an economic zone is characterized by an asser-
tion of coastal State jurisdiction to exploit and conserve living and
nonliving resources of the seabed, subsoil, and superjacent wa-
ters.4 Delegates to the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS IH)5 refer to the second and more ex-
1. See text accompanying notes 86-101 infra.
2. OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NATIONAL MARiIME
CLAIMS 2, 7 (1979).
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id. at 6.
5. The eight completed sessions of the Third UNCLOS are: first session, New
York City (December 1973); second session, Caracas (June-August 1974); third
session, Geneva (March-May 1975); fourth session, New York City (March-May
1976); fifth session, New York City (August-September 1976); sixth session, New
York City (May-July 1977); seventh session, Geneva (March-May 1978); eighth ses-
sion, Geneva (March-April 1979) and New York City (July-September 1979). See
generally F. GARcm-AmADoR, LATwN AmERICA AN TE LAw OF THE SEA (Law of
the Sea Institute, Occasional Paper No. 14, 1972); Alexander, The Extended Eco-
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pansive concept as the "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ).6 As de-
fined at UNCLOS III, the EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to
the territorial sea in which the coastal State may claim sovereign
rights in addition to jurisdictional rights for the purposes of ex-
ploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the living and non-
living resources of the seabed, subsoil, and superjacent waters.
7
Unilateral coastal State claims to extended resource jurisdiction
have been characterized as internationally invalid.8 Article 2 of
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas9 is a specific chal-
lenge to an argument that coastal State claims to ocean jurisdic-
tion create legal limitations on the activities of other States.
Article 2 of this Convention codified customary international law
when it described the high seas as "being open to all nations" so
that "no state may validly purport to subject them to its sover-
nomic Zone and United States Ocean Interest, 10 COLUAL J. WORLD Bus. 35 (1975);
Katz, Consequences of the Economic Zone Catch Opportunities of Fishing Nations,
2 MAR. STUDY MANAGEMENT 144 (1975).
6. The term "exclusive economic zone" appears in the Revised Informal
Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.10/Rev. 1 (1979), reprinted
in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALS 686 (1979) fhereinafter cited as RICNT]. See gener-
ally Knight, Issues Before the Third United Nations Conference On The Law Of The
Sea, 34 LA. L. REV. 155 (1974).
7. See RICNT, supra note 6, art. 55, 56. The UNCLOS EEZ concept would af-
ford the coastal State jurisdiction over the regulation of other economic activities
in the zone including the production of energy from the water, currents, and
winds; the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
marine scientific research; and the preservation of the marine environment. Id.
art. 56. The zone would not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Id. art. 57. "Mile" is
used hereafter to mean "nautical mile." One nautical mile equals 1.151 statute
miles or 1.852 kilometers. The territorial sea is an area of sovereign coastal State
jurisdiction adjacent to the coast. Id. art. 3. Article 2 of the RICNT would limit it
to 12 nautical miles. A territorial zone of up to 12 miles is generally accepted
coastal State practice. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland)
[19741 LC.J. 23, 24. See H. KNIGHT, CONSEQUENCES OF NoN-AGREEMENT AT THE
TmiD U.N. LAw OF THE SEA CONFERENCE (Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, Studies in
Transnational Legal Policy No. 11, 1976). Within the EEZ are preserved to some
degree the traditional high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight, the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, fishing subject to coastal State sovereign rights,
and research subject to coastal State jurisdiction. Convention on the High Seas,
done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, reprinted in 52
Am. J. INT'L L. 842. Article 2 specifically recognizes, inter alia, the traditional free-
doms of navigation, fishing, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and
freedom of overflight as general principles of international law. Id. art. 2. The con-
cept of a fishery zone limits the freedom of fishing. The UNCLOS EEZ would ex-
tend limitations to all economically related uses of the zone.
8. Phillips, The Exclusive Economic Zone As A Concept in International
Law, 26 INV'L L.Q. 585, 585 n.2 (1977). But cf. Pardo, The Emerging Law of the Sea
and World Order, in THE LAw OF THE SEA TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE PROCEED-
INGS 403 (1976) (the main elements of the future law of the sea including a 200-
mile EEZ are clear). See generally 1 B. BuzAN, SEABED POLIrICs 67 (1976).
9. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 7.
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eignty."' 0 Subject to resolution of the legal effect of this Conven-
tion on unilateral claims of sovereignty over ocean resources,
these claims may create an obligation on the international com-
munity to acquiesce to them as law."1
The two recognized processes by which coastal State claims to
ocean resource jurisdiction can become binding international
law12 are by expression in an international treaty and by the for-
mation of customary law.13 Eight sessions of UNCLOS MII have
failed to produce a binding treaty. Therefore, any compulsory in-
ternational character attributable to these coastal State claims is
entirely contingent upon either a preexistent international con-
vention or the customary law process.
A customary economic zone, defined by the general practice of
States, would specify the rights and obligations of all nations as
definitively as would a convention. Just as a treaty governs the
conduct of its signatories, a custom, which has become a general
practice accepted as law, requires the submission of the interna-
tional community. Recognition of the obligatory nature of coastal
State claims to economic zones could result in universal 200-mile
coastal State resource zones involving thirty-seven percent of the
world's ocean,14 ninety-four percent of the world's fishing catch,15
and all presently exploitable offshore oil and gas deposits.16 Addi-
tionally, approximately eighty percent of marine scientific re-
search' 7 and the majority of world shipping affected by pollution
regulations would be subject to coastal State jurisdiction.
In an examination of the customary law process, former Justice
Manley 0. Hudson of the International Court of Justice found
that considerable agreement existed among authors of treatises
as to the requisite four elements for the establishment of a rule of
customary international law.' 8 Within the framework of his four-
10. Id. art. 2.
11. See generally Fleischer, The Right to a 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone
or a Special Fishery Zone, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 548 (1977).
12. 4 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (2d ed. E. Lauterpacht 1978).
13. See text accompanying notes 66-77 infra.
14. H.R. REP. No. 588, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 15 (1977).
15. Alexander, New Approaches to Control of Ocean Resources, in INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF OCEAN SPACE 67, 68 (R. Wirsing ed. 1974).
16. In 1974, 17% of the world's oil was taken from offshore wells. By 1980, it is
estimated that 33%% of the world's oil will come from offshore wells. Id. at 71.
17. 74 DEP'T STATE Bum. 537 (1976).
18. This definition, by the late Judge Manley 0. Hudson of the World Court,
includes the elements of generality, temporality, recognition, and acquiescence.
part definition, this Comment will demonstrate that 200-mile
claims to fishery zones and to economic zones have achieved the
status of customary international law. Alternatively, if evidence
that economic zones are customary law is not yet sufficient, such
adequacy is imminent.
History of Claims to Ocean Resource Jurisdiction
Unilateral and multilateral claims to 200-mile ocean resource ju-
risdiction developed concurrently with coastal State interest in
protecting offshore living and nonliving resources. Initial concern
focused on resource competition between contiguous States and
the fishing fleets of distant maritime nations.19
The first dramatic unilateral claim to extended ocean resource
jurisdiction was embodied in the Truman Proclamations of 1945.20
The United States thereby claimed the natural resources of the
subsoil and seabed of its continental shelf, primarily to assure a
stable investment climate for American oil companies. Addition-
ally, the United States claimed fishery conservation jurisdiction of
the superjacent waters in order to protect New England
fisheries.21 The principle of unilaterally claimed sovereignty over
offshore resources became generally accepted international law
without protest.22 This principle was thereafter expressed in vari-
ous types of claims which developed initially in South America.23
In 1947, Chile declared 200-mile ocean resource jurisdiction24 in
Working Paper on Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission,
[1950] 2 Y.B. INTI'L L. CoMi'N 24, 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1950/Add. 1 at 5
[hereinafter cited as Statute of the International Law Commission].
19. For a survey of historical background bearing on claims to an EEZ, see D.
JOHNSTON & E. GOLD, THE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: SURVEY, ANAL-
YSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CURRENT TRENDS 1 (1973).
20. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 884 (1945);
Pres. Proc. No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 885 (1945). The Tru-
man Proclamations stated that the natural resources of the subsoil and the seabed
of the United States continental shelf "appertained" to the United States and were
subject to its jurisdiction and control. The superjacent waters expressly remained
high seas.
21. Pres. Proc. No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 885 (1945).
22. 1 H. LAUTERPAcHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw 64 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1970). The
Truman Proclamations received international sanction in the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.LA.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S.
311.
23. See generally F. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 5; Garcia-Amador, The Latin
American Contribution to the Development of the Law of the Sea, 68 Ai. J. INT'L L.
33 (1974).
24. UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAws AND REGULATIONS ON THE RE-
GIE OF THE HIGH SEAS 6, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 at 6 (1951); 4 M. W=HEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 794-96 (1965). Chile's territorial sea claim was to
sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the living and nonliving resources of the sea-
bed, subsoil, and superjacent waters. At least theoretically, the classic territorial
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an effort to protect its infant, offshore whaling industry from the
competition of the whaling fleets of maritime States. Chile based
its claim on the international precedent of the October 1939 Decla-
ration of Panama25 and on the principle of unilateralism of the
Truman Proclamations. 26 Peru, interested in developing its
fishmeal industry based on its anchoveta resources, adopted a
200-mile policy similar to that of Chile in the same year.2 7 Ecua-
dor followed suit in 1951 to protect its fishing resources from the
United States tuna industry.28 These early efforts to protect off-
shore resources from foreign competition were premised on an in-
herent right of the coastal State to those resources. This right
was based on a theory of the geographical continuity of the land
sea claim denies the high seas freedoms of other States. Chile's claim, however,
did provide for reciprocal fishing rights with other States as well as innocent pas-
sage rights. See generally F. GARcL-AmADoR, supra note 5. The United States, un-
like Chile, did not claim resource jurisdiction of the superjacent waters because
United States oil interests were primarily focused on the nonliving resources of
the seabed and shelf. Chile's incorporation of the Truman Proclamations' separate
mention of the continental shelf was an afterthought in order to take advantage of
the precedent. Chile's claim reveals its primary preoccupation with offshore living
resources.
25. Declaration of Panama, 1 DEP'T STATE BULL. 331-33 (1939).
26. In developing a proposal for the Chilean government excluding whaling
from Chile's shores, JermAn Fischer, an international legal expert, was consulted
by the attorney for Companie Industrial, a Chilean whaling company. Mr. Fischer
was to locate some international precedent for a claim to offshore jurisdiction. He
seized upon the 1939 Declaration, established by United States initiative at the
outbreak of war in Europe, to serve as a neutral or safety zone in which belliger-
ents were precluded from hostilities. The width of this zone varied from 300 to 500
miles. Chile's zone was close to 300 miles wide, but company officials were reluc-
tant to recommend such an expansive claim when they were interested only in
protecting whaling operations to approximately 50 miles. Ultimately, Chile settled
on 200 miles based on a narrow reading of the Declaration. See Comment, The Ori-
gins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 495 (1977).
27. Supreme Decree No. 781 of August 1, 1947, El Peruano, Diario Oficial, Au-
gust 11, 1947, reprinted in UNrrED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, supra note 24, at
16, and in 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 24, at 797-98.
28. Maritime Hunting and Fishing Law (Decree No. 003, Feb. 22, 1951), Ano III,
Registro Oficial 6219-20, reprinted in 4 M. WHIrEMAN, supra note 24, at 799-800. Ec-
uador's claim was very similar to that of Peru. In 1952, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru
established a policy of a "maritime zone" in the subregional Declaration of Santi-
ago, the first multilateral agreement. UNrrED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIEs, LAWS
AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA 723, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/
SER.B/6 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of Santiago]. Although the three
governments "proclaim as a principle of their international maritime policy that
each of them possess sole sovereignty and jurisdiction" there is no doubt that this
"special jurisdiction," in light of the economic purposes of each, is claimed for spe-
cific objectives, and that it impliedly recognizes freedom of navigation. Id. Accord,
Garcia-Amador, supra note 23, at 38.
and sea29 and available international precedent. This rationale
was supported in the Declarations of Santiago (1952),30 Monte-
video (1970),31 and Lima (1970).32
Early South American claims typify a territorial sea claim. This
is a claim to the sovereign right to control all activities in adjacent
waters as well as to the exclusive right to exploit and conserve
the resources of the seabed, subsoil and superjacent waters. The
classic territorial sea claim is premised on the view that the 200-
mile adjacent ocean space is an extension of the land. It is, there-
fore, subject to the same sovereignty which the coastal State ex-
erts over its land territory. Accordingly, this type of claim
theoretically denies the high seas freedoms of other States, al-
though it provides for innocent passage.
In 1972, the Caribbean States adopted the Declaration of Santo
Domingo33 which provides for a '"patrimonial sea."34 While pre-
serving in modified form the traditional noneconomic high seas
freedoms of other States, coastal State patrimonial sea jurisdic-
tion, like the EEZ, extends to all economic uses of the seabed,
subsoil, and superjacent waters, pollution control and scientific
research.
The 1972 African States' Regional Seminar on the Law of the
Sea adopted the Yaound& conclusions,3 5 which declare that Afri-
29. The coastal States of Peru, Ecuador, and Chile addressed the special rela-
tionship that they have to resources near their coasts, and the rights and obliga-
tions that arise as a result of this nexus, in the preamble to the Declaration of
Santiago, supra note 28, reprinted in f1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L COMM'N 169-70.
Governments are under an obligation to secure the necessary conditions
of subsistence for their peoples and to provide them with the means for
their economic development. Consequently, it is their duty to provide for
the conservation and protection of their natural resources and to regulate
the exploitation of those resources to the best advantage of their respec-
tive countries.. . . It is therefore also their duty to prevent exploitation
of the said resources outside their jurisdiction from jeopardizing the exist-
ence, integrity and conservation of this wealth to the detriment of nations
which, owing to their geographical positions possess in their seas irre-
placeable sources of subsistence and vital economic resources.
Id.
30. See Declaration of Santiago, supra note 28.
31. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/34 (1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1081
(1970).
32. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/28 (1970), reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 207
(1971).
33. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/80 (1972), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 22
(1972). Ten countries approved: Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Hondu-
ras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Trinidad, and Venezuela.
34. The patrimonial sea is similar to the EEZ concept envisioned by the UN-
CLOS in RICNT, supra note 6, arts. 55-61. For a specific analysis of similarities
and differences between the EEZ and the patrimonial sea, see Garcia-Amador,
supra note 23, at 39.
35. The seminar was held in Yaound6, Cameroon, June 20-30, 1972. U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 138/79 (1972), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 210 (1973).
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can States have the right to establish an economic zone within
which they have exclusive jurisdiction to control and regulate pol-
lution and the living resources of the sea.36 The zone's establish-
ment is to be without prejudice to the noneconomic high seas
freedoms.3 7 Further, a unanimous recommendation was made to
African States to extend this sovereignty over all resources in the
economic zone.38 A maximum limit to this economic zone was not
specified. Kenya presented draft articles on an economic zone to
the Second Subcommittee of the United Nations Seabed Commit-
tee in August of 1972.39 These articles, based on the Yaound6
Conclusions, specified a 200-mile limit. In 1973, a 212-mile eco-
nomic zone was adopted by the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) in the Addis Ababa Declaration. 40 Claims on the African
continent are similar to the patrimonial sea claims of the Carib-
bean States and can be fairly characterized as claims to an EEZ.
In addition to the territorial sea, patrimonial sea, and economic
zone claims, a fourth type of claim gained popularity in the 1970's.
This is the comparatively modest claim to exclusive fishing rights
in adjacent waters.41 A fishery zone does not encompass coastal
State rights to the nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil.
Therefore, it does not significantly restrict the noneconomic high
seas freedoms of other States.
By the opening of the 1974 session of UNCLOS MI, a trend was
established on two continents, and over 100 States through writ-
ten or oral statements supported the concept of a 200-mile eco-
nomic zone.42 The origin and development of this concept was
contemporaneous with the realization by coastal States that their
ocean resources are finite,43 and that the advanced technology of
36. Id. para. I(a) (3).
37. Id.
38. Id. para. II.
39. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC.Il/L.10 (1973), reprinted in 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 21) 180-82, U.N. Doc. A/8721 (1972). The distinct feature of this proposal is the
recognition of the rights of the LL/GDS to share in the renewable resources of the
economic zone.
40. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/33 (1974), later confirmed through another meeting
held at Mogadishu, Somalia, from June 6-11, 1974.
41. Iceland's claim in 1972 extending its fishery limits to fifty miles is typical.
Resolution of the Althing Concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction, February 15, 1972, re-
printed in 11 INer'L LEGAL MATERIALs 643 (1972), and in 1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA 89 (1973).
42. Mirvahabi, Significant Issues in the Law of the Sea Conference: Illusions
and Realities, 15 SAN DIEGo I. REV. 493, 497 (1978).
43. For one view of the state of United States fisheries and the problem of
developed nations is capable of consuming those resources at an
unprecedented rate. Economically rather than doctrinally in-
spired, early claims express primary concern with assuring
coastal State ability to compete for living resources in their adja-
cent seas. This goal was extended to include an interest in non-
living resources due to parallel advances in the technology of
exploitation. The development of the EEZ concept at UNCLOS
and in the practice of States reflects this expanded coastal State
concern with all economic interests in contiguous waters.
PRESENT STATUS OF T=E ECONOMIC ZONE AT UNCLOS I
Upon commencement of the negotiations at UNCLOS H, con-
flict existed between developed maritime States and undeveloped
and developing coastal States. The dissension concerned the
characterization of the economic zone. The maritime States con-
ceptualized the zone as basically high seas in character except for
specific and limited uses afforded coastal States. Undeveloped
and developing coastal States defined it in terms of a territorial
sea. This conceptualization would preserve to other nations
rights limited to the traditional noneconomic high seas free-
doms.44 The landlocked States45 and geographically disadvan-
taged States4 6 allied with the maritime States to almost evenly
divide Committee Il on this issue prior to the appearance of the
Conference's first negotiating text.47 The Revised Informal Com-
over-fishing of certain stocks, see HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISH-
ERIES, REPORT ON THE FISHERIES CONSERVATION ACT OF 1975, H.R. REP. No. 445,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This report is typical of the literature on the subject.
44. Clingan, The Emerging Law of the Sea: The Economic Zone Dilemma, 14
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 530 (1977).
45. The term landlocked States refers to the 30 States that have no coastline
and therefore have no chance for an EEZ.
46. Specific identification of the geographically disadvantaged States is diffi-
cult in the absence of a legal definition of geographical disadvantage. In the com-
promise formula submitted at the seventh session held at Geneva, these States
were described as "coastal States, including States bordering enclosed or semien-
closed seas, whose geographical situation makes them dependent upon the ex-
ploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of other States
in the sub-region or region, for adequate supplies of fish for the nutritional pur-
poses of their population or parts thereof, and coastal States which can claim no
exclusive economic zones of their own." See Reports of Comnittees, U.N. Doe. A/
Conf.62/RCNG/l, at 78 (1978).
47. The Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) was the first text produced
by the Conference after the Geneva session in 1975. U.N. Doe. A/Conf.62/WP.8, re-
printed in 4 UNCLOS I OR 137, and in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS 682 (1976). Al-
though article 47 of the ISNT provided for "other internationally lawful uses of the
sea related to navigation and communication," the maritime powers desired more
than an arguable right to exercise high seas freedoms in the zone. See the Report
of the Chairman of Committee II, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L. 17 (1976), for an account
of the attempts to reach a compromise during that session. The ISNT was fol-
lowed by the Revised Single Negotiating Text U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.8/Rev.1
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posite Negotiating Text, produced during the eighth session of the
Conference, reorganized all of the material of three earlier texts
into a comprehensive draft treaty. This text adopts a 200-mile
limit to the EEZ and attempts to accommodate the conflicting
characterizations of the zone by endorsing neither extreme.48 In-
stead, a functional approach to the EEZ is proposed to define the
rights and obligations of all States in the zone.4 9 This approach
would mean that the rules applicable to the EEZ would depend
upon the use to which the zone was being put. For purposes of
navigation and related uses, high seas principles would apply.
Coastal State discretion would apply to uses related to economic
exploitation, exploration and conservation.
The trend of the UNCLOS negotiating texts has been to gradu-
ally afford the coastal State all rights in the EEZ necessary to
control any activity connected with the exploitation and conserva-
tion of its living and nonliving resources. Agreement through
compromise has been reached that these rights are economic, and
that other States would retain traditional noneconomic high seas
freedoms subject to the Convention.50 Defining the zone as
neither high seas nor territorial but as sui generis5 ' has permit-
(1976), the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.10
(1977), and the RICNT, supra note 6. These texts have no binding effect. They are
documents designed to generate ideas and, presumably, agreement. See genertally
Knight, The Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area:
Background, Description, and Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8 SAN DIEGo L. REV.
459, 477-86 (1971).
48. Subparagraph (a) in article 56 of the RICNT, supra note 6, establishes the
sovereign rights of coastal States including the right to control "other activities for
the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of
energy from the water, currents and winds." This emphasizes that the sovereign
rights are economic rights and not territorial rights in the zone itself. Article 87,
reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAE.AIAs 686, 726 (1979), retains the words "inter
alia" before the enumeration of the specific freedoms of other States in the zone
and clarifies them as full freedoms, not merely passage rights.
49. [A]ny uses of the economic zone that are associated with freedom of
navigation or overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines
are now safeguarded as rights of other countries, and the rights of coastal
States are those specifically identified with protection, management and
conservation of the living and non-living resources of the area together
with certain other specifically enumerated rights.
Status Report on the Law of the Sea Conferences: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) (testimony of Ad-
miral Holloway).
50. See Laylin, Emerging Customary Law of the Sea, 10 INT'L LAw. 669 (1976)
for a very general discussion of matters on which the UNCLOS delegations are in
accord.
51. Andres Aguilar, Chairman of the Second Committee as well as the Vene-
ted general agreement on the EEZ concept at UNCLOS I.
A sui generis zone represents a medial position affording
coastal States primary control over economic activities within
their EEZ's while preserving certain basic, noneconomic privi-
leges to the international community. This concept permits sepa-
ration of demands for access to resources in the EEZ from
demands for access to the zone for reasons unrelated to re-
sources. It is an attempt to accommodate two traditional law of
the sea doctrines: the freedom of the high seas and coastal State
sovereignty over adjacent waters. The 1958 Convention on the
High Seas is traditionally thought to preclude sovereignty over
the high seas.5 2 Conversely, the 1958 Convention on the Territo-
rial Sea and the Contiguous Zone provides that the sovereignty of
a State extends beyond its land territory and internal waters to a
belt of sea adjacent to its coast described as the territorial sea.53
A sui generis characterization of the EEZ is an attempt to com-
promise the conflicting doctrines. With regard to freedom of
transit, the zone has the characteristics of the high seas. With re-
gard to the acquisition or preservation of resources, the zone has
the characteristics of the territorial sea. This flexible view of the
economic character of coastal State rights and of the 200-mile
width of tleir economic jurisdiction has been agreed upon by a
majority of the delegations at UNCLOS 111.54
However, absent a ratified treaty, UNCLOS consensus or dis-
sension on the EEZ has little application to the regulation of con-
duct in the international community. The standard by which to
assess the propriety of coastal State claims to resource jurisdic-
tion must therefore be found in preexistent international prece-
dent or in the fulfillment of the prerequisites to the formation of
customary international law.
CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS AND EXTENDED COASTAL STATE
RESOURCE JURISDICTION
The Geneva Convention on the High Seas defines the high seas
as all parts of the sea not within the territorial or internal waters
of any State.5 5 Further, it declares that "no State may validly pur-
port to subject any part of [the high seas] to its sovereignty." 56
zuelan delegation, first referred to the EEZ as sui generis in article 45 of the ISNT,
supra note 47.
52. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 7.
53. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.IA.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
54. See generally Laylin, supra note 50.
55. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 7, at art. 1.
56. Id. art. 2.
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Within this area, the high seas freedoms are inter alia, the free-
doms of navigation, fishing, the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, and overflight.57 Literally interpreted, this Convention
precludes State resource jurisdiction in any area beyond the
ocean boundary of the territorial sea. However, the concept of a
fishery or economic zone is not necessarily inconsistent with this
proscription.
The high seas freedoms are not characterized by the Conven-
tion as absolute. Article 2 states that these freedoms must be ex-
ercised with reasonable regard for the exercise of like freedoms
by other States.58 This stipulation concedes that high seas free-
doms are qualified to the extent necessary to insure their preser-
vation in the interests of all States including coastal States. A
qualified freedom is subject to regulation consistent with the pur-
pose of its restriction. Additionally, the Convention conditions
exercise of the high seas freedoms not only upon Convention Ar-
ticles but upon "other rules of international law." 59 Therefore, the
high seas freedoms are also subject to -egulation by applicable in-
ternational treaties as well as by customary rules accepted as law
in the international community. Accordingly, the High Seas Con-
vention does not foreclose recognition of coastal State economic
zone regulation as customary international law.
Additional international precedent also supports the proposi-
tion that the high seas freedoms are subject to regulation by
coastal States. The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone provides that conditions on the exercise of
high seas freedoms are not precluded by the literal terms of the
High Seas Convention.60 The Convention on the Territorial Sea
establishes a twelve mile area adjacent to the territorial sea called
a contiguous zone. The Convention explicitly recognizes a need
for increased coastal State competency within this zone to pre-
serve the coastal State's own interests in its adjacent waters.61
Although not specifically addressed to resource jurisdiction, the




60. See Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 53, at art. 24.
61. Article 24 expressly authorizes the coastal State the "control" necessary to
both punish and prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary
regulations within its territorial sea. The contiguous zone is an area adjacent to
and beyond the territorial sea. Id.
doms of other States is subject to the interests of coastal States in
regulating activities in their contiguous zones.
62
The Geneva Conventions contemplate regulation of the high
seas freedoms by treaty. The Truman Proclamations, predating
the Convention on the Continental Shelf and recognized as inter-
national precedent, unilaterally restrict exercise of the high seas
freedoms on the United States continental shelf. The United
States claim to jurisdiction of shelf resources was without
prejudice to the exercise of high seas freedoms in the superjacent
waters of its shelf63 However, the United States also provided for
conservation of offshore fishery resources including a provision to
exclude foreign State fishing if necessary to effect conservation ef-
forts. This resource conservation jurisdiction, viewed as an ac-
cepted customary condition on the exercise of the high seas
freedom of fishing in the interests of all States, is not incompati-
ble with the Convention on the High Seas.
However, even if the High Seas Convention is irreconcilable
with the concepts of fishery or economic zones, those portions of
the Convention which conflict may no longer be viable.6 4 If the
general practice of States is contrary to the Convention, there is
no longer a consensual basis supporting that precedent. In real-
ity, it may have become custom to ignore those portions of the
Convention inconsistent with present State practice. Accordingly,
the Convention on the High Seas may be viewed as either com-
patible with the practice of coastal States in claiming ocean re-
source jurisdiction, or superseded to the extent that it conflicts
with such practice. Either view entails a flexible approach to law
62. In an exhaustive approach to an understanding of unilateralism, Professor
McDougal states:
The lawfulness of states' claims to an occasional exclusive competence
in contiguous areas must of course be appraised in terms of the more gen-
eral poliey underlying the whole public order of the oceans, which, as we
have seen, is that of securing the fullest production of values compatible
with their equitable distribution. Generally speaking, this goal is to be
sought by protecting the widest ambit of inclusive use and competence
and restricting exclusive authority, comprehensive or occasional, to the
narrowest bound possible--on the theory that freedom of use to all who
possess the necessary capabilities is desirable for fullest production and
widest distribution. It must be recognized, however, that there are certain
exclusive interests, common to all states, which may require exercise of
unilateral protective measures in the contiguous areas beyond the territo-
rial sea.
M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PuBIuc ORDER OF THE OCEANS 575, 578 (1962).
63. See Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 22.
64. One commentator describes the 1958 Conventions as generally "Passe"
with the exception that the Convention on the Continental Shelf may continue to
be a basis for claims until replaced by a new treaty. Stanford, Future Enforcement
of the Exclusive Economic Zone, 5 DALHousx LJ. 73, 102 (1979).
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as process, which is preferable to that of law as immutable princi-
ples incapable of accommodating change.
THE EEZ AS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law is the body of rules of conduct, enforceable by external
sanction, which confer rights and impose obligations primarily, though not
exclusively, upon sovereign States, and which owe their validity both to
the consent of States, as expressed in custom and treaties and to the fact
of the existence of an international community of States and individu-
als.
6 5
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
outlines four sources of international law.66 The first three are in-
ternational conventions, general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations, and the judicial decisions and teachings of pub-
licists. 67 The fourth source is general practice accepted as law.68
In disputes among nations, the Statute instructs the court to ap-
ply "[i] nternational custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law ... "69 The general practice of States creates an
expectation in the international community that such practice
will continue. It also evidences a general consensus that the prac-
tice is accepted as law.70 Custom is the procedure whereby ob-
servable general norms are recognized as law. This recognition is
traditionally referred to as opinio juris sive necessitatis, or acqui-
escence.71
Commentators differ as to the precise definition of the prerequi-
sites for a general practice to be recognized as law. There is little
agreement both on the relative importance of particular elements
in the definition and even on the necessity of specific elements.
However, international law scholars have identified four elements
which they have agreed form the parameters of the controversy.
65. H. LAUTERPACET, supra note 22, at 9.
66. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993.
67. Id. para. 1(a), (c), (d).
68. Id. para. l(b).
69. Id.
70. See generally 0. IassrrzyN, INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY AND ToMoRRow
(1965).
71. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 662,
665 (1953). Mr. Kunz describes usage as encompassing a general, though not uni-
versal, practice in the domain of international relations continuing over a period of
time without interruption. Id. at 666. Opinio juris sine necessitatis means that a
practice must be applied with the conviction that it is legally, as opposed to
merely morally, binding. Id. at 667.
These four elements are identified in the decisions of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and by one of its former justices, the late
Manley 0. Hudson as:72
a. concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of
situation falling within the domain of international relations;
7 3
b. continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of
time;
7 4
c. conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevail-
ing international law;7 5 and
d. general acquiescence in the practice by other States.
7 6
This breakdown of the elements of custom has not stilled the
controversy over the formation of customary law. However, the
four factors do provide a framework in which to discuss issues
commonly regarded as significant in the customary law formation
process. These prerequisities must be examined and applied to
existing coastal State claims to ocean resource jurisdiction with
the understanding that they are intertwined and interdependent
in may aspects.
Concordant State Practice
The practice of nations must be both common and consistent
with that of a sufficient number of States to be considered ordi-
nary conduct in the international community. 77 A particular prac-
tice must be generally followed, but participation need not be
unanimous. 78 The number of adherents necessary for a particular
practice to be recognized as a custom depends on the extent of
the impact of that custom on the international community. The
more vital the interest affected, the more participants should be
required to evidence the general consent of nations. Because es-
72. See Statute of the International Law Commission, supra note 18.
73. This element is also identified by the International Court of Justice in the
Fisheries Case, [1951] LC.J. 116 and in the Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. 266.
74. The temporal element is noted in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case,
[1969] LC.J. 74, reprinted in 8 INr'L LEGAL MATERLs 340, 375 (1969).
75. In the Lotus Case, the Permanent Court states that, in determining the
motivation of a State abstaining from action, "only if such abstention were based
on their being conscious of a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an
international custom." The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.LJ., ser. A, No. 10, at 28. See gen-
erally North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] LC.J. 3, 41-44, in which opinio
juris sive necessitatis is emphasized as an essential element in the formation of
customary law.
76. See H. LAUTERPACET, supra note 22, at 64, in which acquiescence is
equated with a lack of protest.
77. The actions of nations play a vanguard role in the formation of customary
international law. Tribunal decisions and scholarly writings play a secondary role.
Rickey, Custom and Land-Based Pollution of the High Seas, 15 SAN DiEGo L. REV.
409, 413-14 (1978).
78. G. TuNKIN, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (1953). Accord, A.
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (1971); H. LAUTER-
PACHT, supra note 22, at 62.
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tablishment of an EEZ affects significant State interests,
7 9 strict
generality of practice should be required before such a custom is
viewed as binding on those nations that do not adhere to the EEZ
concept.80
The unilateral acts of States are significant in evidencing the
generality of a practice. Sovereignty precludes one State from
unilaterally imposing obligations on another State without the lat-
ter State's consent.81 A unilateral, extraterritorial claim to an
EEZ is a public act indicative of domestic policy. This act be-
comes precedent because it manifests an attitude toward similar
acts by other States. The act itself is not law,8 2 but it evidences a
recognized practice. These acts of territorial delimitation which
do not concern a common frontier between two States or conflict
with international law are precedent for a customary rule when
initiated with the intent to affect legal relations.
83
Although a unilateral act may create obligations on a declarant
State through some type of estoppel effect, it is doubtful that the
act alone creates rights in favor of the acting State. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice has recognized that the four sources of in-
ternational law enumerated in Article 38 may not be exclusive.
84
In the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court acknowledged that unilat-
eral acts in themselves may be a source of obligation for the de-
clarant State when it is that State's intention to be bound, even in
the absence of a negotiating context.8 5 Regardless of whether a
79. See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
80. The contention that existing rules are binding on new States independent
of consent is not incompatible with a consensual basis for the formation of new
customary rules. MacGibbon, Customary International Law and Acquiescence, 33
BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 115, 137 (1957).
81. Wright, Custom as a Basis for International Law in the Post-War World, 2
TEx. INT'L L.F. 147, 153 (1966).
82. Some commentators have argued that such acts may, however, create
rights for others and duties upon the acting State, and that those rights become
definitive when accepted or exercised. Virally, The Sources of International Law,
in MANUAL OF PUBLIc INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968).
83. Id. at 156.
84. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 67.
85. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), [1974] LC.J. 253, Nuclear Tests (New
Zealand v. France), [1974] LC.J. 457. One commentator contests the validity of
this decision based on the lack of quid pro quo in the unilateral declaration of
rights by a State. Rubin, The International Legal Effect of Unilateral Declarations,
71 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1977). The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases do not address the
binding character of the unilateral act of Iceland in extending its fishing zone to 50
miles. The Court merely found that the act was not opposable against the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
single unilateral act is an alternative source of binding custom, it
indicates consent to a reciprocal practice and is precedent for es-
tablishing the generality of such practice.8 6
It can be assumed that one State acknowledges the validity of
another State's claim to a 200-mile resource zone if the first State
also claims a similar zone for itself. This general consent is mani-
fest in the multiplication of such precedents even if it is conceded
that a single declaration creates no rights or obligations whatso-
ever. It is this consent, evidenced by the generality of a practice,
which gives rise to the binding character of customary rules.
8 7
Accordingly, general consent to a fishery zone or an EEZ will be
evidenced by the number and similarity of claims existing in the
international community.
A general practice must be both quantitatively sufficient and
qualitatively concordant. The quantitative aspect is satisfied by
sufficiently large numbers of participants in a practice. The quali-
tative element of practice refers to the substantive similarity of
State claims. The general practice of claiming an economic zone
is established on several continents.
On the South American Continent, the trend began in the late
1940's and early 1950's with the territorial sea claims of Chile, Ec-
uador, and Peru.88 Although theoretically excluding the high seas
freedoms of other States, these claims were primarily motivated
by an economic interest in living and nonliving ocean resources.
The derogation- of high seas freedoms inherent in these claims
was, therefore, the by-product of, rather than the impetus for, the
claims. These three States were joined by six other nations at
Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1970.89 Shortly thereafter in Lima, Peru,
five more nations declared economic interests in their adjacent
waters.9 O Ten Caribbean States followed suit at Santo Domingo
in 1972.91 In the same year, seventeen African nations claimed a
right to an economic zone. 92 This principle of unilateralism es-
poused by countries in South America and Africa was emulated
in the early 1970's on a worldwide basis as evidenced by the dec-
larations to ocean resource jurisdiction of Great Britain,93 the So-
(United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] LCJ. 3, 34-35; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] LC.. 23, 205-06.
86. Virally, =upra note 82, at 156.
87. See The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.LIJ., ser. A, No. 10 at 18. See also id. at 59-60
(Nyholm, J., dissenting); id. at 96 (Altamira, J., dissenting).
88. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
89. See Declaration of Montevideo, supra note 31.
90. See Declaration of Lima, supra note 32.
91. See Declaration of Santo Domingo, supra note 33.
92. See Yaoundd Conclusions, supra note 35.
93. L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1977, § I, at 22, coL 1.
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viet Union,94 the United States,9 5 Canada,96 and Mexico.
97
All of the 133 independent coastal States presently claim fishery
zones varying in distance from 3 to 200 miles.98 Seventy-nine
States, or sixty-two percent of all claims to fishery zones, have es-
tablished 200-mile limits to their fishery zones.99 Of these sev-
enty-nine claims, forty-four, or thirty-three percent of all claims,
are to a 200-mile zone characterized as an EEZ100 because juris-
diction over living resources has been extended to encompass the
nonliving resources of the ocean.
Variation in the width of zones claimed does not preclude rec-
ognition of a 200-mile limit to either type of zone for two reasons.
First, there appears to be little concern with the linear extent of a
claim to resource jurisdiction other than that it not exceed 200
miles.1 0 ' This limit to fishery or economic zones is reflected in the
practice of the majority of States.102 Second, not all States may
be sufficiently motivated to claim 200-mile jurisdiction of any type.
At least sixty-seven States are likely to either make no claim at
all or make one which would not extend to 200 miles.103 A 200-
mile jurisdiction would not benefit these States because of their
short coastlines, entrapment by convex coastal configurations, lo-
cation on partially enclosed seas, or the fact that they are land-
locked or shelf-locked.10 4 Accordingly, almost half of the ninety
coastal States which would benefit by a full 200-mile claim have
already claimed a 200-mile EEZ unilaterally.105 Seventy-nine of
those States whose interests are vitally affected have at least
94. L.L. Times, Dec. 11, 1976, § I, at 16, col. 1.
95. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882
(Supp. II, 1976) (effective March 1, 1977).
96. Wash. Post, July 5, 1976, § I, at 10, col. 1. For an exhaustive treatment of
the EEZ concept as applied in Canada, see Stanford, supra note 64, at 73.
97. Wall St. J., June 7, 1976, at 7. See generally Szekely, Mexico's Unilateral
Claim to a 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone: Its International Significance, 4
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L W.J. 195 (1977).
98. See U.S. DEP't OF STATE, supra note 2, at 1.
99. Id.
100. Id. Forty-two of the forty-four States claiming a 200-mile EEZ are included
in the list of seventy-nine States claiming a 200-mile fishery zone.
101. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 550-52.
102. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 2.
103. Hodgson & McIntyre, National Seabed Boundary Options, in NATIONAL Ju-
RISDICTION OVER THE SEA 152, 166-67 (1974).
104. Id.
105. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 2.
claimed a 200-mile fishing zone.10 6
Qualitatively, a 200-mile claim by seventy-nine States to exclu-
sive jurisdiction over living resources is similar to an EEZ claim
to both living and nonliving resources. Article 24 of the Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone recog-
nizes a need for coastal State competency in adjacent waters
though it does not address resources. 0 7 The 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf affords coastal States natural re-
source jurisdiction over the shelf though this jurisdiction is not
expressed in terms of a 200-mile limit.108 Further, the principle of
the Truman Proclamations to claim resource jurisdiction of the
continental shelf unilaterally is accepted international law.10 9
These precedents, combined with the unanimous practice of
claiming offshore fishery jurisdictions, are equivalent to the con-
cept of the EEZ to the limited extent of resource jurisdiction. At
minimum, a coastal State's economic interest in nonliving off-
shore resources can hardly be said to be less compelling than a
recognized claim to its living resources.
The practice of the majority of the fourteen States presently
claiming a 200-mile tritorial sea, theoretically limiting all high
seas freedoms, contributes to the generality of EEZ practice for
three reasons.1 10 First, the majority of these claims are compati-
ble with general EEZ practice in that their focus is primarily eco-
nomic." Further, recognition of a twelve-mile territorial sea as
customary international law would preclude a classic territorial
sea claim in excess of that distance.112 Finally, those territorial
106. Id.
107. See Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 53.
108. See Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 22.
109. Id.
110. The 14 States claiming 200-mile territorial seas, as of July 1979, are Argen-
tina, Benin, Brazil, Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Panama,
Peru, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uruguay. See note 2 supra.
111. Eight of the 14 are clearly functional rather than classic territorial sea
claims. Brown, Maritime Zones: A Survey of Claims, in 3 NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA 157 (1973). Of these eight claims, Argentina and Uruguay recog-
nize overflight and navigation beyond twelve miles. Id. at 67. Chile, Mexico, Nica-
ragua, Peru, Costa Rica, and El Salvador expressly recognize the freedom of
navigation. Id. at 172-73. The author of this Comment is concerned here with the
general practice of States. Therefore, individual differences are of little import un-
less those differences are of a sufficient magnitude to occasion protest. An ex-
haustive review of minor individual differences is beyond the scope of this article.
112. Professor R. Y. Jennings, in a paper read at the 1976 Conference of the In-
ternational Law Association, referred to certain principles or rules not accorded
international recognition, in these words:
Indeed the conference itself even without a treaty may well assist to crys-
tallize new custom which is already emergent from the actual practice of
States; to take an obvious example, the 12-mile territorial sea is probably
here to stay, but that will be so whether it is expressed in a treaty or not,
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sea claims which do not recognize the noneconomic, traditional
high seas freedoms either expressly or impliedly may not be en-
forced in areas in which they are incompatible with the concept of
the EEZ in the general practice of States. 113 However, evidence
of lack of enforcement of territorial sea claims, precluding naviga-
tional rights of warships, for example, can admittedly only be pro-
vided by the absence of international incident when such rights
are exercised. It is clear that there is an international general
practice claiming economic jurisdiction of the living and nonliving
resources of the seabed, subsoil, and superjacent waters to a dis-
tance not to exceed 200 miles. Within this area, the traditional
noneconomic high seas freedoms are at least impliedly preserved
even in the majority of territorial sea claims.
The Temporal Requirement
The second requisite element to the formation of a rule of cus-
tomary international law is "continuation or repetition of the
practice over a considerable period of time."u 4 Repetition over a
particular period of time is essential to the formation of a rule of
conduct. However, the period of time in which the repetition
must occur must be defined in terms of the generality of prac-
tice.1 15 The purpose of the temporal requirement is to determine
and if it is expressed in a treaty, then irrespective of whether the treaty is
widely ratified or not.
See Laylin, supra note 50, at 67. By analogy, the 12-mile territorial sea has similar
numerical support to the EEZ. Seventy-six of 133 coastal States claim a 12-mile
territorial sea at present. Seventy-nine States claim a 200-mile fishing zone. See
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 2. A zone for the limited purpose of exploiting
natural resources was expressly recognized by the International Court of Justice
in 1974 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, (Federal Republic of Germany v. Ice-
land) [1974] I.C.J. 23.
113. See Status Report on the Law of the Sea Conference: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977) (testimony
of Elliot Richardson).
114. See Statute of the International Law Commission, supra note 18.
115. See A. D'AmATO, supra note 78, at 60-64. Accord, Hickey, supra note 77, at
414-15. No criteria exist in the literature to determine how much time is necessary
to create a usage that can qualify as custom "even if differing cases were assumed
to need differing amounts of time." A. D'AmATO, supra note 78, at 58. Judge Lau-
terpacht, former Justice of the World Court, defines the temporal requirement by
focusing on the change itself. He states that the time required to change a usage
to a custom is proportionate to the degree and intensity of the change. This
formula is not only helpful in recogninzing the relationship, but it implies that no
initial values can be assigned in isolation from the practice under consideration.
Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BwRT. Y.B. INV'L L 376, 393
(1950).
if there has been sufficient time to assure awareness by the inter-
national community of a State's act and to permit community ac-
quiescence or protest."16 Perhaps the requirement of a
"considerable period of time" is more accurately characterized as
a requirement of a "sufficient period of time.""17 The Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases
similarly does not divorce the temporal requirement from evi-
dence of demonstrable participation in a practice."i8 Generality
and temporality are perhaps two alternative ways of stating the
same prerequisite. The temporal requirement can therefore be
conceptualized as a by-product of recognized, concordant State
practice.
Although inextricably related to the element of concordant
State practice, the temporal requirement has at least two unre-
lated aspects. First, technological progress in the area of world
communication can be expected to diminish the requisite time for
registering assertion, knowledge, and response."19 Second, when
a State's act vitally affects the interests of other States so that a
motivation to protest is strong, the time period for formulating
and communicating the response may be very brief.120 UNCLOS
EI assures intimate familiarity with the content of individual
coastal State claims to ocean resource jurisdiction. Evidence of
universal awareness of unilateral claims to resource jurisdiction
is extant not only in the negotiations at UNCLOS but in the rapid
116. A. D'AMATo, supra note 78, at 60-64.
117. "Customary... international law is based upon the common consent of
nations extending over a period of time of sufficient duration to cause it to become
crystallized into a rule of conduct." 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 1 (1940) (emphasis added).
118. Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily,
or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international
law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an in-
dispensable requirement would be that within the period in question,
short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose in-
terests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtu-
ally uniform in the sense of the provision invoked,-and should moreover
have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule
of law or legal obligation is involved.
North Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1969] LC.J. 74, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 340, 375 (1969).
119. Because "every event of international importance is universally and imme-
diately known, the requisite incubation period for the creation of a customary
norm may be very brief." K. WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAw 67,
68 (1964).
120. Fitzmaurice, The Law And Procedure Of The International Court of Justice
1951-54: General Principles and Sources of Law, 30 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 31 (1953).
"A new rule of customary law based on the practice of States can in fact emerge
very quickly, and even almost suddenly, if new circumstances have arisen that im-
peratively call for legal regulation-though the time factor is never wholly irrele-
vant ..... Id.
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increase in claims modeled on the applicable UNCLOS negotiat-
ing text provisions.' 2 ' The doubling of economic zone claims
since 1977 is clearly a response engendered by awareness and ac-
ceptance of the concept, albeit for varying reasons. 22 Because
this response has occurred, it can be concluded that the time re-
quired to respond has been sufficient. The proliferation of claims
to an EEZ in the 1970's took place over a period of time which
may be characterized as sufficient by the generality of practice
achieved within that period.
Resolution of the issues surrounding the temporal requirement
not only depends upon the degree of generality of a practice, but
also relates to an understanding of the psychological requirement.
Lacking this requirement, many commentators believe that no
amount of time can transform a usage into a norm of customary
international law. The presence of this element may also be im-
plicit in the generality of EEZ practice.
The Psychological Requirement
The psychological component, also referred to as "recognition,"
is generally considered a necessary element in the formation of a
customary law.123 The International Court of Justice alludes to
this requirement in its definition of a custom as a "long-standing
uniform state practice accompanied by an opinio juris sive neces-
sitatis."'124 Opinio juris refers to the belief by a State that it acts
121. Twenty-eight claims to an EEZ have appeared since 1977. These claims
were not the result of extended fishery zones because they were nonexistent as
such in 1977. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 2.
122. In January 1977, twenty-seven States claimed what is characterized by
the Department ofState as a 200-mile EEZ or fishery zone: Angola, Bangladesh,
Benin, Canada, Chile, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Ireland, Maldives, Mexico,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union. As of July 1979, sev-
enty-nine States claimed a fishery zone, of which forty-two also claimed an EEZ.
Twenty-eight of the claims to an EEZ in 1979 made no claim at all in 1977. There-
fore, twenty-eight of the forty-four present claims were nonexistent as fishery
zones in 1977. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 2.
123. "[I]nternational legal doctrine of other countries, with rare exceptions,
considers 'recognition' or opinio juris a necessary and decisive element for the
creation of a customary norm of international law." G. TuNKIN, supra note 78, at
119.
124. North Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1969] LC.J. 41. A summary of the
court's jurisprudence in the area is found in United Kingdom v. Iceland [1974],
LC.J. at 89-90. (DeCastro, J., separate opinion). See also A. D'AMATO, supra note
78.
or is precluded from acting by internationally accepted norms of
behavior. International scholars, however, differ as to the neces-
sity, importance, and application of this requirement.
Proponents of one school of thought125 believe the psychologi-
cal element to be unnecessary. Because this group posits that a
norm becomes customary interntional law by repetition alone,
they find the motive for a behavior superfluous.' 2 6 Representative
of the majority view is an insistence on some belief by the acting
State that its conduct comports with internationally accepted
principles of law.127 The International Court of Justice appears to
invoke this requirement in two general situations: 1) to empha-
size the distinction between international custom and courtesy; 28
and 2) to determine the reason for a State's inaction,129 because
from inaction alone, it is difficult to draw any objective conclusion
as to a State's position on an issue. The disagreement as to the
necessity for the presence of opinio juris has perhaps created
more difficulties in theory than in practice.130
Sir Hirsch Lauterpacht adopted a flexible approach to the ma-
jority view, formulating what appears to be the most workable
125. See 0. LissrrzYN, INTERNATIONAL LAw TODAY AND ToMoRnow 32-35 (1976);
R. OAD)R, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 93-99 (4th ed. 1963); Ghil, The Legal Charac-
ter and Sources ofInternational Law, in 1 ScANDiNAvIAN STUDiEs iN LAW 53, 80-84
(1957).
126. "Custom represents in social reality nothing other than a tradition, a series
of uniform actions, generalized and prolonged for an indefinite period." R. OADI,
supra note 125, at 95.
127. See A. D'AMATO, supra note 78, at 60-64; C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND RE-
ALiTY iN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 154-59 (2d ed. 1968); G. TumuN, supra note 78
at 118-24. See generally H. KELSON, PRMnCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 441 (R.
Tucker, ed. 1966).
128. See Asylum Case, [1950] LC.J. 266, 286. Courtesy can be the impetus for a
usage such as inspired the rule of salutes between vessels of war. Similarly, con-
venience may be the motivation, such as that illustrated by the use of white paper
in diplomatic exchanges. These acts are revocable acts of courtesy and accommo-
dation not perpetuated in the belief that they are obligatory in any sense. Accord,
Virally, supra note 82, at 134.
129. It has been pointed out that, apart from the opinions of three individual
judges (Judges Nyholm and Altamira in the Lotus case, and Judge Negulesco in
the Advisory Opinion Concerning the European Commission of the Danube), the
Court only once emphasized the element of recognition and then only in the nega-
tive sense that its absence precluded the existence of a customary rule. In the Lo-
tus case, the Permanent Court stated that the rarity of judicial decisions by
municipal courts in the matter of assumption of jurisdiction over aliens for of-
fenses committed abroad merely indicated the fact of abstention from judicial pro-
ceedings. It did not show recognition of any obligation to refrain from exercising
such jurisdiction. See the S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.LJ., ser. A, No. 10. In other cases
in which it was concerned with the application of rules of customary international
law, no mention was made of opinio juris, and the court was satisfied with proof of
a constant general practice in the matter in question. MacGibbon, supra note 80,
at 129.
130. See generally Briggs, The Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case and Proof of
Customary International Law, 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 728, 730 (1951).
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analysis of the psychological element. He stated that "conduct
which is originally followed spontaneously as a matter of social
habit, convenience, reasonableness, accommodation or necessity
acquires the complexion of some kind of obligation; the conduct
thus followed as a matter of inarticulate obligation gives sub-
stance and confirmation to its legal character."'31 Accordingly,
the conviction that a practice is generally required by interna-
tional standards, although not a legally obligatory standard, ac-
quires an element of legal obligation when the practice becomes
sufficiently general. This interpretation of the majority require-
ment, that the acting State believes its conduct accords with in-
ternationally accepted principles of behavior, is more reasonable
than the stricter interpretation that requires preexistent belief in
the legality of the practice. The acts of States could never evolve
into a custom accepted as law if a preexistent legal standard were
essential.132 This statement is self-evident because a belief in the
legality of an act is necessarily premised on a perception that the
act is compatible with accepted legal precedent. However, an ini-
tial precedent could not be formulated in the belief that it is legal
when no standards yet exist by which to assess that legality. For
example, after the Second World War, when the doctrine of the
continental shelf became general practice, it was not clear
whether the absence of protest stemmed from consciousness on
the part of silent States of a clear legal duty to abstain from pro-
test or from a recognition or approval of the reasonableness of
the claim.
Opinio juris is perhaps applicable if the reason for submission
to a practice is unclear, but it is unnecessary as a criteria by
which to evaluate the motivation for the assertion of a right.133
State A may or may not assert a right in the belief that its act is
131. See H. LA='rERPAcHTr, supra note 22, at 65.
132. Joseph Kunz has addressed the problem of the original formulation of a
norm of customary law when there is no prior law on the point by stating that the
"very existence of such a norm would presuppose that the states acted in legal er-
ror." He, however, posed no solution. See Kunz, supra note 71, at 667.
133. When a rule is expressed as an obligation on the part of State A, it is per-
haps pertinent to examine if A's act in compliance with the obligation is done with
the opinion that the act is legally obligatory. When the rule is expressed as a
claim of right, such as a unilateral claim to resource jurisdiction, the original pre-
cedent could not possibly have been propounded in the opinion that it was legal.
When the practice is expressive of an obligation, opinio juris may be relevant, but
even then it is little more than the consequence of previous consent or acquies-
cence. See MacGibbon, supra note 80, at 144.
consistent with international law. Its subjective motivation may
vary from convenience to self-interest. The significance of A's act
in the area of norm formation is not the subjective motivation for
the act. The act is significant because it indicates A's consent to a
similar practice on the part of State B.134 Certainly the basis for a
binding international custom is the general, though not necessar-
ily unanimous, consent by the international community to be
bound by a norm rather than the "legality" of an acting State's
motivation.135 Therefore, except for situations where a State ab-
stains from action or where there is insufficient evidence of the
generality of the practice or where it is suspected that a particu-
lar act was motivated with no conviction of right, opinio juris is
not a prerequisite to the recognition of a general practice as law;
it is only additional evidence of consent or acquiescence. 136
Professor A. D'Amato analyzed the process by which the Court
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 137 determined which op-
erative portions of a treaty were binding on nonsignatories.
D'Amato offered an interpretation which can be used to analyze
the binding nature of customary right assertion.138 His theory
was that the Court, in analyzing treaty provisions binding on the
United Kingdom and Germany, stated a rule of manifest intent by
which nonsignatories may be bound by treaty provisions which
meet specified requirements. First, the provision in question
must be generally applicable to the international community.
Second, the form and structure of the specific provision must indi-
cate that it was included with the intent to bind nonsignatories.
These two requirements, rather than the subjective intent of the
author of the provision, determine the existence of an intent to
bind nonsignatories. Although the customary international law
formation process requires tacit consent, as compared to the pat-
ent consent which generates a convention, both custom and con-
vention must be interpreted in order to determine which States,
in addition to the participants, are obligated. Professor D'Amato's
rule of treaty interpretation is, therefore, equally applicable to the
134. An often quoted passage from the majority opinion of the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the Lotus case states that 'rules of law binding
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conven-
tions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law." The S.S.
Lotus, [1927] P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10.
135. See MacGibbon, supra note 80, at 119; H. LAUTERPAcHT, supra note 22, at
65.
136. See H. LAuTrERPACHT supra note 22, at 65. D'Amato, Treaties As A Source of
General Rules of International Law, 3 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 25 (1962).
137. See North Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1969] LC.J. 74; 63 Am. J. Ir'L L. 591
(1969).
138. D'Amato, Manifest Intent and the Generation by Treaty of Customary
Rules of International Law, 64 Am. J. IN.'L L. 892 (1970).
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binding nature of the acts of States in the area of customary law
formation. First, it is undeniable that an assertion of legal rights
by a coastal State to a fishery or economic zone generates recipro-
cal limitations on the general freedoms of other States in the
zone. Second, the assertion of such rights is an objective manifes-
tation of intent that other States respect the claim. Credible evi-
dence of the existence of the psychological element is latent in
the manifest practice of States claiming fishery or economic zones
regardless of the availability of extraneous evidence of a subjec-
tive opinio juris.
If a subjective opinio juris were required before an asserted
right could evolve into customary law, inquiry as to the subjective
belief of a declarant State could end with a statement by that
State that it acted in the belief that its act accorded with estab-
lished rules of international law. However, a State unilaterally
declaring rights to a resource zone should be estopped from con-
testing the legality of a reciprocal, similar claim by another State
regardless of the first State's subjective view that the second
State does not have such rights. By its act a State tacitly con-
sents to similar acts by other States. If a State indicates consent
to the concept of a fishery zone or economic zone by asserting ei-
ther claim, that consent should supersede a contrary stated intent
or subjective political motive and govern the legal status of the re-
sultant customary norm. Certainly no international tribunal
would inquire into the propriety of the motivation for unanimous
coastal State claims to an EEZ when required to determine the
legal status of such claims.
Accordingly, the importance of the psychological element in the
context of unilateral claims to ocean resource jurisdiction is that
it provides additional evidence of consensus. The most compel-
ling evidence of the existence of the EEZ or fishery zone as cus-
tomary law is found in the manifest practice of States. Consent to
unilateral declarations is demonstrated by similar assertions or
the failure to protest a known declaration. Therefore, in the area
of the acquisition of customary rights to a fishery zone or EEZ,
the role of opinio juris is largely indirect and replaced by the
fourth component, acquiescence, which serves as the expression
of international consent.
Acquiescence
The final component of customary law formation requires "gen-
eral acquiescence in the practice by other States."' 39 Interna-
tional rights become obligatory only with the general consent of
the international community.140 Acquiescence is the method by
which States demonstrate this consent when a practice com-
mands their submission rather than some affirmative response.
In the law of custom, consent is tacit in the acquiescence to a
known practice and patent in an affirmative reaction to it.
UNCLOS m provides a forum in which the degree of consensus
underlying the general concept of the EEZ is vocalized and to
some extent clarified. States have also demonstrated national
policies consistent with the UNCLOS model by incorporating it
into unilateral claims of their own.' 4 ' Acquiescence, or its ab-
sence, however, may not necessarily be inferred from a list of
those States at UNCLOS I which have either fostered or pro-
tested the EEZ concept. The verbalized, apparent positions of in-
dividual UNCLOS delegations may not reflect their convictions as
to existing or desirable law. Conference positions may be
adopted for other reasons including efforts to gain trade conces-
sions or pledges of reciprocal support on issues tangentially or
completely unrelated to the UNCLOS. Therefore, what a State
does in practice is more credible evidence of its national policy
than is its position at UNCLOS I1.142
Although the deliberations at UNCLOS I may not provide
valid evidence of acquiescence to a known practice or a basis
upon which to evaluate an affirmative reaction to it, knowledge by
all delegations may be assumed. Absent a showing that foreign
States recognize a coastal State's act as a claim of territorial sov-
ereignty, the failure of any State to protest is not alone tanta-
mount to acquiescence. 4 3  An affirmative showing of
139. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra note 18. See gener-
ally H. LAUTERAcHT, supra note 22, at 64.
140. In a passage comparing the process of development of customary and pre-
scriptive rights, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice noted that:
both depend on the establishment of a practice or usage-one general and
the other particular-and each derives its eventual legal sanction from
some form of consent on the part of States--either their general accept-
ance in the one case, and in the other specific recognition or tacit acquies-
cence. Apart from any difference in the time factor the method (practice
and assent) is the same both for the establishment of new customary law
and for the acquisition of prescriptive or historic right.
Fitzmaurice, supra note 120, at 31 n.3.
141. The Department of State presently characterizes the claims of 44 coastal
States as claims to an EEZ. See U.S. DEP'T STATE, supra note 2, at 7.
142. Accord, Fleischer, supra note 11, at 570.
143. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 185 (1975), rev'r 497 F.2d 1115 (9th Cir.
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acquiescence to an EEZ concept is difficult to demonstrate. Un-
like the expected protest to a territorial claim on a contiguous
State, the resistance to an EEZ claim will be of a lower order be-
cause the element of confrontation will not be as severe or imme-
diate. Consent is presumed, however, whenever a State performs
an act which has international legal implications. 14 4 For example,
if one State's citizens fish without a license in the fishery zone of
a coastal State which requires licensure of all foreign vessels, the
coastal State may acquiesce with knowledge of the infraction by
doing or saying nothing. Even if the coastal State cannot enforce
the license requirement, it must be presumed that it acquiesces
in the right to fish without a license if it does not at least protest
vocally.
Conversely, a failure to protest punitive measures taken against
a State's citizens for their violation of another State's fishing li-
cense requirement also creates a presumption of acquiescence.
One example of how a failure to protest may equate with acquies-
cence is the response of the United States to foreign seizures of
United States tuna boats. The United States has passed legisla-
tion to offset fines of its citizens fishing without a license in for-
eign waters.145 One section of a two-part act provides for
reimbursement of fines paid by tuna boat owners for the release
of their crews and boats seized by foreign States for license viola-
tions.146 The remaining section provides for deduction of these
reimbursements from foreign aid payments to the "seizing" coun-
try.147 The seizure of United States tuna boats indicates the act-
ing State's claim of right to fishery jurisdiction. United States
failure to implement its legislation providing for deduction of rec-
ompensed sums from foreign aid implies that the United States
acquiesces to the right to enforce such a resource claim. 4 8 Inac-
tion or silence, with knowledge of a resource claim, permits such
a rule to evolve regardless of the fact that the acquiescence may
1974) verbalizes the self-evident proposition that agreement is not a logical infer-
ence of silence.
144. G. TuNn, supra note 78, at 123; contra, K. WOLFKE, supra note 119, at 157-
65; MacGibbon, supra note 80, at 131.
145. The Fishermen's Protective Act of 1954, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1977 (1970).
146. Id. § 1973.
147. Id. § 1975.
148. See generally Fisher, Wood & Bruge, Latin American Unilateral Declara-
tions of 200-Mile Offshore Exclusive Fisheries: Toward Resolving the Problem of
Access Faced by the U.S. Tunafish Industry, 9 Sw. U.L REV. 643 (1977).
not be motivated by the recognition of a legal duty to acquiesce.
This inference of consent is strengthened by the passage of time,
the growth in the number of claims, and the extent to which they
are enforced.
If silence is not to be inferred as consent, the burden is on
seemingly acquiescing States to protest. The extent of the appar-
ent consensus on the EEZ at UNCLOS I149 has similarly shifted
the burden of protest to acquiescing States. It is significant that
the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States have not
protested the concept of the EEZ. They have merely sought to
preserve some rights within that concept for themselves. 5 0 Simi-
larly, maritime States such as the United States have indicated a
willingness to accept the concept provided that noneconomic ac-
cess rights are satisfactorily protected.151 Accordingly, consent
may be implied by the lack of protest to the EEZ concept at UN-
CLOS III, a forum which would facilitate the expression of pro-
test. However, an even more convincing argument that consent to
the concept of an EEZ exists, or at least that it exists as to a 200-
mile fishery zone, is its patent presence in the practice of States.
Consent is patently implied from the conduct of States when
they recognize the legality of a practice by participating in it and
insisting that others observe it.152 This consent has already been
demonstrated by the large number of similar claims to an EEZ.
Seventy-nine coastal States have indicated that they recognize
living resource jurisdiction. 153 Forty-four have expressed their
consent to an EEZ.154
CONCLUSION
Unilateral claims to fishery zones and economic zones are in-
spired by increased State awareness of the importance of the re-
sources in adjacent waters. The High Seas Convention is
consistent with the expression of this awareness in the form of a
fishery zone or an economic zone. The legal status of these zones
determines the ability of coastal States to protect these resources
as well as the right of other nations to pursue their own interests
in the zones of coastal States. The claims can command obedi-
ence by international treaty or by the formation of customary law.
149. See Laylin supra note 50.
150. See generally Nelson, The Emerging New Law of the Sea, 42 MOD. L. REV.
42, 54, for a discussion of the position of the landlocked and geographically disad-
vantaged States at UNCLOS.
151. See Clingan, supra note 44, at 539.
152. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 120, at 68.
153. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 2.
154. Id.
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UNCLOS III has not yet produced global obligation by treaty. Un-
willing to gamble future economic prosperity on the fate of UN-
CLOS M, coastal States have asserted rights in adjacent waters
to insure that prosperity. These claims are precedent for the for-
mation of customary international law.
Claims to both fishery zones and EEZ's satisfy the four prereq-
uisites of a general practice accepted as customary international
law. The fishery zone has achieved unanimity of practice al-
though distances vary. The majority of these claims prescribe
their outer boundary at 200 miles. The 200-mile economic zone is
claimed by a majority of the coastal States whose geographic loca-
tion permits a resultant benefit. UNCLOS Il provides interna-
tional awareness of the quantity and quality of these coastal State
claims. The numerical response to that awareness in the form of
reciprocal claims indicates de facto fulfillment of the temporal re-
quirement. The psychological element is patent in the recogni-
tion inherent in the assertion of a similar claim. Similarly,
reciprocity demonstrates acquiescence in the justification for
coastal State ocean resource jurisdiction.
Accordingly, customary law is reflected in the majority claim to
living ocean resource jurisdiction to a distance of 200 miles. A
near majority of these claims extend that jurisdiction to nonliving
ocean resources. To the extent that this practice defines the
rights and obligations of the international community, it is inter-
national law binding nations who may refuse to ratify it in the
form of a convention produced by UNCLOS 1I.155 General recog-
nition of the need of the coastal State to regulate the exploration,
exploitation, and conservation of vital resources in its adjacent
sea has preempted the negotiations. What remains to be defined
are those areas of rights in potential conflict not presently articu-
lated in the general practice of States. Absent a UNCLOS In defi-
nition, custom will continue to fill the gap by its traditional
method of assertion and response.
CAROLYN HUDSON
155. See RICNT, supra note 6, art. 56.

